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The worldisrapidlybecomingmoreeconomically integrated. Thiswas
announcedwithdramaticflourishbythe dismantling ofthe EasternEuro-
pean socialisteconomiesat the turnofthe decadeandthe signingofthe
WorldTradeOrganization (WTO) accordinMarakkeshin1993.Ratherthan
a drasticupheaval,the processhas been one of continualopeningof
individual countrymarketsorof groupsof countries (inspiteof the impres-
siongivenby periodicannouncements of increasing protectionism and by
calls for protectionby certainsectors).Figures1 to 3 showtotaltrade,
exportsandimportsinproportionto grossdomesticproductforfourASEAN
countries from the 1980sto 1990-1994..
This increasedintegration in the goods market hasbeen matchedby a
parallel integration in financial markets. Figure 4, for example, shows the
increasing flow of capital to the developing countries. From the 1960s to
1993,there hasbeen almosta hundredfold increasein annualflows.Table
1 shows the average ratio of capital flows to grossdomestic product for
some developing countries during 1980-1989. Figure 5 shows the more
recent trends of the gross capital flows ratio.1 With increasing financial
flows, equity market capitalization has also increasea. Figure 6 showsthe
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FIGURE 3
Imports as Percentage of GDP
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TABLE 1
Ratio of Gross Capital Flowsto GDP
(Annual average, in percent)
1980-1989 1984-1986 1987-1989
Philippines 8.94 9.77 6.09
Malaysia 9.10 10.10 8.88
Indonesia 4.96 4.45 7.15
Thailand 6.20 6.45 6.04
Singapore 21.15 22.99 23.07
Korea 5.42 5.27 4.25
India 1.50 1.51 2,31
Pakistan 3,58 3.46 4.58
Bangladesh 3.79 3.77 3.57
Sri Lanka 9.15 9,14 10.37
Chile 16.70 24,18 13.63
Uruguay 8.04 4.57 9.65
Venezuela 6.48 3.36 9.04
Mexico 9.01 9.05 6.98
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increase for the four ASEAN countries. This hasstrengthened the integra-
tion of the countries' securities and equity markets intointernational finan-
cial markets. Table 2 shows the inflows of foreign direct investment (as
percentageof GDP) for selectedAsian and LatinAmerican economies and
a similar inference can be drawnfrom it.
These data showing increasing integration of world financial markets
have raised fears that countries have become vulnerable to policies and
events happening outside their borders and beyond their control. There is
an increasing feeling of vulnerability to external events and policies under-
taken byauthorities notsubjectto domesticinfluence.There isalso afeeling




Recentphenomena in internationaleconomicrelationshave ledtocalls
for economic policy coordination. But while the gut impression of deeper
international relationships and heightened vulnerability is easily grasped,
the bases and details ofeconomic coordination requiremore specification.
One proposal, for instance, proceeds from the increased vulnerability of
economies to eventshappening outside their pale of control. With increas-
ing global interaction in finance and communication, the adjustments and
anticipation of events around the world have become quite rapid and,
because of this, stronger.The impact of external events has become both
more difficult to anticipate (and absorb) and larger. Economic policy coor-
dination(andcooperation) could helpin avoidingor moderatingthe adverse
impact of external events through preemptive and preventive macroe-
conomic cooperation or, at least, consultation.
The otherthrustfor economicpolicycoordinationstemsfrom the simple
increase in economic interaction because,of increased trade, finance,
communication andotherchannelsmentionedearlier_Increased commerce
among countries brought about by worldwide liberalization and the deep-PADERANGA: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 85
TABLE2
Inflow of FDIto GDP Ratios
1970 1980 1990
Asia
Korea 0.82 0.01 0.30
Taiwan 0.01 0.10 3.35
Singapore 4,91 9.36 13.90
Thailand 0.61 0,58 2.96
Malaysia 2.24 3.74 5.50
Indonesia 1,44 0.17 0.90
Philippines -0,37 -0.32 1.21
India 0.01 n,a. n.a.
China - 0.16 0.96
Latin America
Chile -0.97 0.76 2,14
Argentina 0.05 0.43 1,93
Mexico 0.84 1.10 1,11
Brazil 0.34 0.80 n.a.
Colombia 0.C0 0.46 1.22
Peru -0.97 0.13 0.09
Venezuela -0.17 0.08 0.93
Source: Urata (1994).
N.A, - not applicable86 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ening of multilateraltrade agreements, especially the WTO, provide oppor-
tunities for interdependent countries. Cooperative or jointly determined
macroeconomic actions can be coordinated for maximum effectiveness.
Strictly speaking, it isonly when a country's economy isfurther affected by
the impact of its own actions on the rest of the world that the openness
becomes interdependent" (Cooper 1985).There are twoways inwhich this
may operate for a smallcountry like the Philippines. First,if countries, as in
the present world environment, warily watch each other and immediately
institute countervailing actions against those which they perceive could
have adverse impact on themselves; and second, if the impact of the
macroeconomic action is confined to a smaller area, then, neighboring
countries, even if small,could start to have strong interdependent relation-
ships.2
Cooper (1985) distinguishes four types of interdependence. Structural
interdependence refersto the situation where two or more economies are
so open with each other that economic events in one strongly influence
economic events in the other. This interdependence implies that each.
country will have a strong interest in information about the structure of the
other economies. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), for example, is
expected to lead to suchclose interdependenceamong the members.That
iswhy there is intensifying interest in what the other member-countries are
doing. •
Everybody expects increased structural interdependence with the im-
plementation of AFTA. What is not so obvious is how each member, even
as of this writing, could be watchfully conscious of the real effective
exchange rates (REER)of every other member becausethey are, in many
cases, competing forthe same markets and alsothinking ofselling to each
other. This is interdependence among the objectives of macroeconomic
policy. That is, one country.is significantly affected by the attainment of
targets in another country.
There may also be high interdependence among the exogenous dis-
turbances to a group of countries. If disturbances that are exogenous to a
•. group of countries are highly.correlated,these disturbances may intensifyPADERANGA:ECONOMICINTERDEPENDENCE 87
the externalitiescaused by high structuralinterdependence.Unfortunately,
the same tendencies which increase structural interdependence (such as
openness, global financial integration, and others) may also increase the
correlations among the exogenous shocks to these economies.
Finally,all of the interdependenciesmentioned abovegive riseto policy
interdependence. As countries become aware of the externalities among
them, they may start manifesting strategic game behavior when deciding
on macroeconomic policy. An international version of the prisoners' di-
lemmawouldbecounterproductiveforall countries.The"beggar-thy-neigh-
bor" attempts bycountries during the Great Depression immediately come
to mind. Onthe other hand,the externalitiescan also be exploitedin order
to magnifythe benefits (orlessen the cost) ofpolicies taken in coordination
with other countries.
All of the foregoing dimensions of interdependence have led to in-
creased calls for economic coordination or cooperation.
The Need for Policy Coordination
Interdependenceamong countries imposes significant externalities or
spillover effects on other countries. Policy actions by some countries have
increasing effects on other economies. Coordination in some form or
another is then seen KSa facilitating mechanism for internalizing these
externalities (FrenkeJet al. 1988).Departingfrom the largely self-contained
economies of previous times, countries have begun to base their policy
decisions on factorsthat includeeven thosewhich are beyondtheir control.
Larger countries which exercise some degree of influence over prices,
including crucial interest and exchange rates,may manipulate such prices
fortheir own advantage atthe expense of others.Coordination is best seen
as a facilitating mechanismfor internalizing these externalities.
The other argument given for coordination is the presence of interna-
tional public goods (Frenkel et al. 1988).
The argument for economic policy coordination under the conditions
mentioned above is not conclusive. There are costs to coordination as will
be discussed in the next paragraphsjust as there are benefits. Andjust as88 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
in the classical case of markets for commodities, the optimal choice for an
individual country depends on the costs and benefits, leaving things in an
uncoordinated situation (the analogue of leaving things to the market) or
committing to the disciplines ofeconomic policycoordination. This raisesa
third alternative beside coordination and laissez faire, that is, the accep-
tance of a common set of rules designed to reduce or make visible the
externalities that countries impose on each other.
Once we acceptthe conclusion that the uncoordinated environment is
untenable, it is the third alternative which can serve as the benchmark of
coordination. An example is a case where uncoordinated national policy
making imposescosts which overwhelm the benefitsof independent policy
decisionmaking. One may choose to lessen the cost of externalities by
accepting rules agreed upon by everybody. Within these rules, countries
can implement policies basedonthe (residually) nationalconditions alone.
The rules may sufficiently lessen the externalitiessuch thatthe net benefits
of this "constraineddecentralized policymaking" may besuperior to closer
coordination among countries.
In a way, the combination of the Bretton Woods Agreement on the
InternatiOnalMonetary Fund (andthe World Bank) and the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an application of the "constrained
decentralized system." Countries accepted some restraints on their ability
to structure trade and tariff policies and adhered to a system of generally
fixed exchange rates in the beliefthat thesewould expand world trade and
thus benefit everybody. The unprecedented growth in the world economy
during the succeeding 40 years istaken by most observers as an indirect
validation of that belief, It is also a model of how some other version of
constrained decentralized policy system can operate. Table 3 shows the
results of Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1995) indicating the short- and
long-term welfare effects of increasing openness and global integration.
Table4 focuses onthe welfare effects ofthe agricultural reform component
of the recent Uruguay Round.
The general observation is that the deepening openness in trade
through the WTO and the increasing globalization of the financial system"o
>
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3Also includesthe Balticcountries, Russiaand othercountnes ofthe former Soviet Union.
MFA - MultffibreAgreement
<£>TABLE 4 (CONTINUED) _o
All Export Production Import
Distortions1 Subsidies Subsidies Distortions
Argentina 0.4 0.I 0.2 0.I
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requires more coordination. The question for a country like the Philippines
is whether a deepening of the constrained decentralized system (i.e.,
additional rules butwith essentially the same mechanism)issuperiorto one
with more formal (and periodic) coordination.
Methods of Policy Coordination
The exact manner of coordination has many levels and dimensions.
Several aspects of economic policy can be the objects of coordination.
Cooper (1985) identifies three.
First, goals can be coordinated. There is a presumption that, if goals
can becoordinated,the relevantmacroeconomic policieswill automatically
be coordinated. Goals can be competitive, common or related to one
another onlythrough general economic interdependence.Goalsare some-
times directly competitive, as in exchange ratetargets where bilateraland
multilateral current account balances are directly affected. Here, countries.
may already engage in strategic game behavior by,for example, pushing
for agreements on goals which favor themselves.
Second, information might be "coordinated" or exchanged Ongoals,
forecasts, economic structure, and intended actions. Individual countries
can then act on the basis of more accurate information on other countries'
future economic magnitudes. This would already bea step toward incorpo-
rating, though incomplete, externalities.
Third, the choice, magnitude .and timing of policy actions might be
.coordinated. It is only under this alternative where several levels and
combinations of commitments are passible.
Policy coordination under the various modesdiscussed above can be
under a strong intercountry government much like that envisioned under
the EuropeanMonetary System,underformal rulesand proceduresbutwith
each country reserving policy implementation to itself, or under a looser
system ofperiodictalksamongthe majorpolicymakerswhereforecasts and
intended policy actions are discussed.
The width and depth of the discussions also have to be agreed upon
and countries will probably consider the exact combination of macroe-PADERANGA: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 95
conomiccoordinationwhich isadvantageoustothemselves.Width or range
pertains to the policies that will be included in the discussion. A good
example of this issue is the present WTO which includes such areas of
coverage as TRIMs (trade-related investment measures),TRIPs (intellec-
tual property rights), and agriculture in addition to trade in commodities,
which isthe onlyareacovered bythe GATT.Asimilar distinctionin the range
of coverage of macroeconomic coordination exists. A wider coverage will
afford more areas for trade-offs which will likely make compromises and
agreements easierto achieve. On the other hand,more areas ofcoverage
also bring in more domestic sectors to consult, lessening policymakers'
flexibility in international negotiations.
The depth of negotiations refers to the specificity and disaggregation
of policyagreementswhich canrangefrom broadcommitmentson macroe-
conomic balances to commitments on such specific items as tax policy
changes. The issue is important because broad agreements on, say,the
government deficit, will have varying impacts on bilateral current account
balances depending on how the deficit or surplus is financed. A similar
distinction can be made in structural policies. On the other hand, more
specific agreements are harderto achieve and may put anyagreement out
of reach.
However,barriers to macroeconomiccoordinationexists.First, interna-
tional policy bargains that involve shared objectives can be frustrated if
some policy instruments,such asexchange rates,are treatedas objectives
in themselves. Second, there can attimes besharpdisagreements among
countries about the effects that policychanges can have on policytargets.
Part ofthe game behaviorcanbeexpressed intrying toget others to agree
to elasticity estimates which .favorone country. Third, countries may dis-
agree about the impact of policy instruments on targets. While the differ-
ences here can be narrowed by analytical studies, national agenda may
preclude a truthful exchange of information. Fourth, there remain huge
cross-country differences in the degree of interdependence, leading to
differences in willingness to submit to disciplines. Finally, international
bargaining comesafterdomestic bargaining,that is,compromises between96 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
growth and stability at the national level may leave little room for further
compromise at the international level.
Experiencewith Global Economic Policy Coordination
In a sense, the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 provided for a
decentralized national policymaking under certain restrictions -- in this
case fixed exchange rates needed for expanding world trade. While this
policy was criticized in various quarters, the arrangement, allowed an
enormous increase in trade and an unprecedented rate and length of
economic growththroughout the world. This arrangement unravelledwhen
growthin othercountries tippedtheeconomic balancetowardmoreequality
betweenthe United States(U.S.), onthe one hand,and Japanand Europe,
on the other, and when the U.S. could nolonger bear the nth country
obligations under the Bretton Woods agreement (that is, low inflation and
disciplined fiscal balance).
Theformal ruptureinthe oldarrangementoccurred onAugust 15,1971
when the U.S.brokethe link betweenthe gold and the dollar consequently
making it incumbent upon other countries to adjust the values of their
currencies. The 10percenttaxon importsthat the U.S. imposedwas meant
to signal the other currencies toadjust their exchange rateswith respect to
the U.S. dollar. On December 17-18, 1971, the Smithsonian Agreement
attempted to savethe Bretton Woodssystem by raising the price ofgold to
$38 per ounce and expanding the exchange rate bands of the major
currenciesto2.25 percentaroundtheir newparvalues (upfrom one percent
under BrettonWoods). However,the system could no longer besalvaged,
and on February 12, 1973 the US. devalued the dollar by 10percent and
all other major countries allowed their currencies to float against it. This
floating rate system has persistedto the presentwith all the major curren-
cies (the US. dollar, the German deutschmark, the British pound, the
Japanese yen and the Swissfranc) without anyfixed officialexchange rate
with one another.
The breakdownof the BrettonWoodsexchange ratesystem turnedout
to bean important stimulus for international economic policy coordination.PADERANGA: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 97
With floating exchangerates,governmentsfound outthey hadmore control
over their macroeconomic policies and proceededto operate in a manner
that was relatively free of the Bretton Woods constraints. However, the
enlarged space for discretionary nationalaction ledtouncoordinated direc-
tions for major economies and markets, resulting in increased external
uncertainty. The consequential difficulties provided the impetus for the
summitconference in 1975whereinflationand balance-of-paymentsissues
occupied the ministers' time. Subsequent discussions were carried out
under the Group of Five or Sevenframework.
Ad hoc coordination of macroeconomic policieswas significantly exer-
cised for the first time in 1978 at the Bonn conference where Japan and
West Germany agreed to accelerate their growth and the U.S. committed
to control its inflation and oil problems. In 1982, the major industrial
countries agreed to strengthen multilateral surveillance at the Versailles
conference.This was intensifiedwith increasingelements of policyconsult-
ation and coordination with the Plaza accord in 1985 where an orderly
appreciation of major nondollar currencies against the U.S. dollar was
deemed desirable. Governments and central banks of five major nations
declared their willingness to cooperate in order to achieve this objective.
The Louvre Accordand the Decemberstatement of 1987confirmed this.A
recent example of this cooperation was the episode last year when the
central banks ofmajor countries (especiallythe U.S.,Japan and Germany)
jointly acted to successfully reverse the appreciation of the yen and the
deutschmark against the U.S. dollar,
Grober (1988)concludesthat thesesummitmeetingsfell shortof policy
coordination in favorof a limited cooperative approach designed to reduce
risk and uncertainty for national policies. Discussion was directed at the
harmonization of policiesand priorities, andjudgment on the functioning of
economies and of national strategies rather than on policies themselves.
"True policy coordination," according to Grober, "would require participat-
ing countries to agree on national measures that are different from those
implemented without coordination." In reality, and especially where the
process isperiodicandcontinuing,this is difficultto distinguishbecause the98 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
discussions will already influencenational decisions long before the incon-
sistencies become glaring.
A more formal version of policy coordination, of course, follows the
structure proposed for the European Monetary Union under the December
1991 Maastricht Treaty which took effect in November 1993. In the final
stage envisioned to be implemented byJanuary 1997(or January 1999.at
the latest),felfillmentofthe fourconvergentcriteriagoverning inflation rates,
fiscal deficits, interest rates and the exchange rate will be realized. Under
this framework, members will be part of an economic and monetary union
with the commencement of a European System of Central Banks, the
irrevocable fixing ofcurrencies againstthe EuropeanCurrency Unit (ECU),
and the rapid introduction of a singlecurrency.Underthis system, member
countries wouldgive upalmost all oftheir independence in macroeconomic
policymaking in returnforthe attainment ofasinglecommodityandfinancial
market. This implies that.the expected benefits of a larger market would
outweigh the loss of benefits from independent macroeconomic policy
action.
Economics of Policy Coordination
The gain from economic policy coordination comes from several
sources. First, is the basic increase in welfare coming from increased
commerce -- goodsand services included-- among countries.This isthe
objective of multilateral trade agreements such as the VVTO.Economic
policy coordinationwhich further diminishes uncertainty in trade and for-
eign exchangeareas, addstothe intensityand breadthofcommerce among
the members. Although it contains other ingredients, the European Com-
mon Market is a good example .ofhow a smaller grouping can enhance
trade even beYOndglobal multilateral systems, which in this case, is the
GATT.
The second source of gain from policy coordination is reduced uncer-
tainty as countries exchange more information abouttheir economic situ-
ation, structure and policies. The third source also comes from reduced
uncertainty when countries unmistakably conveYtheir intentions in eco-PADERANGA: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 9c_
nomic discussions. The third, and very important, source are reduced
adjustment costsandincreased policybenefitsascountriessimultaneously
incorporatethe policy actionsand responsesofother membersat their first
cut in policydesign ratherthan ratchetyadjustmentswhere other countries
adjustand readjust to each other's policies (assuming that there is policy
convergence).
The final sourceof gains comesfrom the increasedability of countries
to undertake difficult policy changes that they would otherwise have been
unable to implement. This makes a presumption, supported by the experi-
ence of multicountry groupings such as the European Community, that
these policycoordinationexercisestypically requirepolicieswhich, in some
sense, are fundamentally good for the countries. As economic policy
coordination exercises become deeper and more frequent, the constant
reminder provides the occasions in achievingthe neededdiscipline.
At the sametime, there are costs toeconomic policy coordination.The
mostobvious isthe lossof strategic behaviorin relation toother countries,
such as exchange ratetargeting. As more information becomes available
and policyreviews becomemore frequent,the ability to retainthis behavior
would bedrasticallyreduced. Thesecondsourceof costs,bothpolitical and
economic, comes from the reduced ability of a country to design and time
policy responsestoexternal (andinternal)events. Thecombination ofboth
developmentswould leadtoa reducedabilitytodesignpolicies finelyhoned
to a country'scircumstances. The trade-off is,of course, improved circum-
stances brought by the positiveexternalities of economic policy coordina-
tion.
MACROECONOMIC COORDINATION FORTHE PHILIPPINES
The Philippine Situation
Data shows that the Philippines is following the general trend of
increasingopenness.Figure1 showshow totaltrade has increased as a
proportionof gross domestic productfor the Philippinesand the other
ASEAN countries.For the Philippines,the pattern shows an increasing100 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
percentage since 1986, a recovery since the lowest point in 1984-1985
(Figure 7). Figures4 and6 show howcapital flows to developing countries
have increased and how the equity market capitalization has increased
tremendously in the Philippines in the last few years.3 The gross capital
flows ratios and foreign investment inflows for the Philippines suggest the
increasing openness of the capital accounts over the past one and a half
decades, particularly in the 1990s.
An interesting issue is the increase in interaction among ASEAN
members with the implementation of the AFTA and the possibility of
deepening of the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC). The in-
creased trade among the ASEAN members is expected to deepen the
interdependence among these countries. Simulation results by Tuh and
Low (1990), for example, show that there will be a decrease in domestic
incomemultipliers andanincrease incross-countrymultipliers with increas-
ing intra-ASEAN trade. Table 5 show the change in multipliers with a 50
percent increase in ASEAN trade. That is, interdependenceincreases with
increasing trade openness.They concludefurther that "better coordination
of trade policies and national policies ... become[s] even more important"
under these circumstances. Yap and dela Paz (1990) also showed that
"while the effects of external shocks on domestic economies could be
reasonably estimated in isolation, there is someworth in testing the effects
using a linked model.''4An integrated outlook may therefore be useful for
nationalpolicymaking.
This increasing interaction raises the possibility that the Philippine
economy is now substantially integrated with global financial markets. In
the last few years, policy reforms have made it increasingly so (Paderanga
1996).Sakai (1994), for example, asserts that Philippine interest rates are
more correlated with New York and Hong Kong interest rates than with
domestic supply and demand conditions. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate
Sakai's hypothesis_A rough and preliminary test using the uncovered
interest rate parity condition (Paderanga and Tan 1996) indicates that the
Philippines is financially integrated with the rest of the world.5At any rate,
currenttrends in the economypointtowardincreasingopennessand integra-TABLE5 -o
Simulation Resultsof a 50%Increase in ASEAN Trade _o
By UsingIncome Multiplierswith Respect to Change in Final Demand m po
_>
z
GI G2 G3 G4 G5 C)
(a)Period 2 m
Indonesia Y1 2.4150 0.0963 0.0508 0.3554 0.0319 o O
Malaysia Y2 0.0295 1.5485 0.0374 0.2904 0.0571 z O
Philippines Y3 0.0105 0.0408 3.0867 0.0450 0.0109
Singapore Y4 0.1078 0.2967 0.0341 1.2480 0.0786 _ 0
Thailand Y5 0.0200 0.0835 0.0117 0.1117 2.5057 _ z m
(b) 50% increase in ASEAN Trade _o
Indonesia Y1 2.3331 0.1573 0.0766 0.4509 0.0555 rn
Malaysia Y2 0.0479 1.4100 0.0525 0.3399 0.0809 m"°
Philippines Y3 0.0169 0.0579 2.9978 0.0610 0.0173 u z
Singapore Y4 0.1368 0.3472 0.0474 1.1014 0.1031 zm
Thailand Y5 0.0325 0.1184 0.0190 0.1471 2.4077 m o
(b)-(a) Differential
Indonesia Y1 -0.0819 0.0610 0.0259 0.0955 0.0236
Malaysia Y2 0.0184 -0.1385 0.015t 0,0495 0.0239
Philippines Y3 0.0064 0.0171 -0.0889 0.0160 0.0064
Singapore Y4 0.0291 0,0504 0,0133 -0.1466 0,0245
Thailand Y5 0.0125 0.0350 0.0073 0.0354 -0.0980
Source: Yap and dela Paz (1990),102 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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t_onwithinthe next few years to a degree that economic vulnerability and
the need for economic policy coordinationwill becomeserious issues.
Policy Coordinationfor the Philippines
The Philippineeconomy is now more integrated in trade and financial
terms with the restof the worldand willrapidlybecomemore so in the
mediumterm. This is especiallytrue for the country'srelationshipswith
otherASEAN countries,ItwillalsobetruewithinAPEC whencooperation
withinthe regionacceleratesas indicatedbyrecenttrends.The questions




market.UnderAFTA, theASEAN marketisno longer indoubt. There,the
taskishowtoadjusttothe newconditions.APEC offersincreasedaccess
throughthe mere exchangeof informationand easier connectionseven104 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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TABLE6
Intra-PacificTrade, 1980 and 1990
1980 1990
1. Intra-Pacific trade
US$ billion 378.0 939.3
2. Intra-North American trade
Dollar value (billions) 102,0 230.0
Share of 1 percent 27.0 24.5
3. Intra-East Asiantrade
Dollar value (billions) 100.7 286.3
Share of 1 percent 27.0 30.5
4. Trade between North
America and East Asia
Dollarvalue (billions) 118.6 326.0
Share of 1percent 31.4 34,7
Source: Dobson (1993).
under the most modest agenda. In both cases, the strategy of the Philip-
pines todevelopunder openmarketswill betremendouslyfacilitated.Table
6 showsthe surgein intra-Pacifictrade duringthe 1980s.This hascontinued
unabated up to the present.
Increased confidence in the co_,ntry'sability to weather crises is also
enhanced by (a) increasedand earlyexchange of informationoneconomic
and political developments, (b) complementary agreements regarding as-
sistance during crises (for example, temporary liquidity arrangements to
respondto adversecapitalflows), and (c) specificcooperative agreements
which may be expected to follow, These have the immediate effect of
decreasing country risk and, therefore, lowering the cost of capital and of106 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
doing business. Increased access, to resources resulting from this can
accelerate development.
Costs of Policy Coordination
The costs of policy coordination consist primarily of the loss of inde-
pendence andthe abilityto maneuver.First,the policyinstrumentsavailable
are less. Forexample, inthat environment, the abilitytotargetthe exchange
rate or usethe exchange rateto target levelsof current account balanceis
severely curtailed. The room for strategic behavior is rendered extremely
limited. No longer available are the predatory export programs and com-
petitive exchange rates used by Japan and the newly industrialized coun-
tries (NIC) inthe past.6 Second,there mayalso be restrictionsonthe depth
and timing of policy instruments which are still available, For one, policy
changes with significant impactonother members will haveto besubjected
first to consultations. A bureaucratic and complicated process may be
required before some policy instruments are adopted. This may make.
decisionmaking unwieldy and inflexible, resulting in opportunity losses.
Finally,because ofthe limitations onpolicyinstruments,some development
strategies which rely on programs that exploit strategic behavior may no
longer be available. At any rate, this commitment constrains policy inde-
pendence to some extent.
RECOMMENDATION
The Philippines needsto recognizethat there are costs and benefitsto
economic policy coordination and have to act on this basis. In the end, it
will have to decide whether it would be a net gain or loss to commit to
economic policy, coordination. The following recommendations can be
categorized into two parts:
(a) suggestions for a research program that will add up the costs.and
benefitsofjoining an economic policycoordination agreement,and identify
the areaswhere policy coordinationwill haveadverse impact and point out
how to insulate these areas; andPADERANGA: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 107
(b) suggestions for the government to formulate a strategy agenda for
discussions on policy coordination.
The researchprogramneedstoidentifythe areasofthe economy which
would have benefitedfrom anenvironmentwithout policycoordination (and
where strategic behavior would be advantageous to the country) and to
analyze how the new environment will affect these areas. The costs of
inflexibility in decisionmaking and the loss ofsome instruments may not be
easily computed butstill havetoberecognized.These costswill beweighed
against the benefitsof committingtopolicy coordination(someof whichcan
beestimated, as in the benefitsfrom increased trade).
The governmentcanthen formulateastrategic agendafor approaching
the economic policy coordination discussions. Several components can
already beidentifiedatthis stage.First,the exclusionofcertainareaswhere
some losses are expected may be negotiated. Second, a temporarydiffer-
ential treatment for countries under certain conditions may also be negoti-
ated. Third, a system where intercountryassistance is available in case of
adverse externalities due to policy coordination may be proposed. Finally,
ruleswhich will have optimalbenefitsfor the Philippines may beformulated
and the government can consequently push for their acceptance.
In the case of economic policy coordination, the correct answer may
not be a categorical yes or no. Rather, it may be how the rules and the
mechanisms are shaped to address the opportunities and problems pre-
sented by the changing environment. The challenge for the Philippines is
how to alter its policies and decisionmaking and negotiating mechanisms
to take full advantage of the opportunitiesprovided by increasedeconomic
cooperation (andwhatever coordination may becollectively agreed upon).108 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
NOTES
1. This figure uses the financial account of the new BOP format of the
International Financial Statistics.
2. The importance of this phenomenon may be inferred from the gravity
models being applied to international trade. See, for example, Frankel et
al. (1995).
3. The absolute values for Thailand and Indonesia are larger but because
their economies are bigger, the percentages are clustered closer.
4.Their results,however,showdecreases(comparedto base runs)in some
macroeconomic variables with increases in intra-ASEAN trade.
5. Montiel's (1994) results using the uncovered interest parity test indicate
otherwise. However,his test covered a period earlier than ours.
6. FormerTaiwaneseMinister for EconomicAffairs K.T.Li once asserted in
a privateconversation that they did not have an exchange rate policy per
se. Butafter they realignedthe New Taiwan Dollar in the late 1950s, they
had a policy of low inflation (which effectively achieved real exchange rate
depreciation under fixed nominal exchange rates).PADERANGA: ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 109
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APPENDIX
Some International CoordinationAgreements
1971 Smithsonian Conferenceon exchange rates.
1975 "First" economic conference, when inflation and BOP disequilibria
had upset the world economy, (Subsequent annual meetings of
heads of seven major industrialcountries followed using the
Group of Five or Seven format)
1978 Bonn Economic Summit: Japan and Federal Republic of Germany
agree to accelerategrowth while the U.S. agreedto control its
inflation and oil problems. (Ad hoc coordinationof macroeconomic
policies begin.)
1982 Versailles Economic Summit: Called for the strengthening of
multilateral surveillance.
1985 PlazaAccord: Elements of policy coordination appeared.
1986 Tokyo Economic Summit: closer and more frequent consultations
between annual meetings.
1987 Louvre Accord: Elements of policy coordination reinforced in
February. Statement ofthe Group of Seven in December
also restatedthis.
Note: Excluded from this list would be.thenearly continuous discussion
and decisionmaking at the executive boards of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.